Introduction to the FAPI Read & Write OAuth Profile

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Chairman of the board



Research Fellow

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OAuth is a framework - needs to be profiled



This framework was designed with the clear expectation that future work will define prescriptive profiles and extensions necessary to achieve full web-scale interoperability.

[txt|pdf] [draft-ietf-oauth-v2] [Diff1] PROPOSED STANDARD Errata Exist Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) D. Hardt, Ed. Request for Comments: 6749 Microsoft Obsoletes: 5849 October 2012 Category: Standards Track ISSN: 2070-1721 The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework Abstract The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction





Which OAuth?




draft-ietf-oauth-iwt-bcp	-00	2017-07-19	Active	
draft-ietf-oauth-mtls	<u>-04</u>	2017-10-12		
draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics	-03	2017-09-10		
draft-ietf-oauth-token-binding	<u>-05</u>	2017-10-27	Active	
draft-ietf-oauth-token-exchange	<u>-09</u>	2017-07-03	Active	
Recently Expired:				
draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution	<u>-03</u>	2017-02-24	Expired	
IESG Processing:				
A draft-ietf-oauth-discovery	<u>-07</u>	2017-09-07	Waiting fo	r Writeup
draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq	<u>-15</u>	2017-07-21	IESG Eval	luation::AD Followup
Published:				
Draft name	Rev.	Dated	Status	Obsoleted by/(Updated by)
draft-ietf-oauth-amr-values	<u>-08</u>	2017-03-13	RFC 8176	
draft-ietf-oauth-assertions	<u>-18</u>	2014-10-21	RFC 7521	
draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg	<u>-30</u>	2015-05-28	RFC 7591	
A draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-management	<u>-15</u>	2015-05-05	RFC 7592	
draft-ietf-oauth-introspection	<u>-11</u>	2015-07-04	RFC 7662	
draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token	<u>-32</u> <u>ipr</u>	2014-12-10	RFC 7519	(<u>RFC 7797</u>)
draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bearer	<u>-12</u>	2014-11-12	RFC 7523	
A draft-ietf-oauth-native-apps	<u>-12</u>	2017-06-09	RFC 8252	
draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession	<u>-11</u>	2015-12-19	RFC 7800	
draft-ietf-oauth-revocation	<u>-11</u>	2013-07-13	RFC 7009	
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer	<u>-23</u>	2014-11-12	RFC 7522	
A draft-ietf-oauth-spop	<u>-15</u>	2015-07-10	RFC 7636	
A draft-ietf-oauth-urn-sub-ns	<u>-06</u>	2012-07-16	RFC 6755	
△ <u>draft-ietf-oauth-v2</u>	<u>-31</u> <u>ipr</u>	2012-08-01	RFC 6749	(<u>RFC 8252</u>)
A draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer	<u>-23</u> <u>ipr</u>	2012-08-01	RFC 6750	
A draft-ietf-oauth-v2-threatmodel	<u>-08</u>	2012-10-06	RFC 6819	

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That creates specification to take care of medium to high risk API access security.





That can serve all financial transactions including PSD2, but not limited to.



FAPI Security Profile is a general purpose higher security API protection mechanism based on OAuth framework.

It has been adopted by Open Banking UK



OPEN BANKING

ABOUT CUSTOMERS DEVELOPERS API PROVIDERS INDUSTRY CONTACT

MAY **17** 2017

Open Banking forms collaboration with OpenID Foundation

The Open Banking Implementation Entity (OBIE), the organisation responsible for the open API banking standard, today announces its collaboration with the OpenID Foundation's Financial API Working Group.

Read More

APR **13** 2017


CMA Appoints New Trustee for Open Banking Implementation Entity

The Competition & Markets Authority ('CMA') has, today, announced that Imran Gulamhuseinwala will become the new trustee for the Open Banking Implementation Entity (the 'IE').

Read More







Australia adopting the same profile

(Source) Chris Mitchel, "Banking is now more open", Identify 2017



It is also recommended by the Japanese Banker's association

オープン API のあり方に関する検討会報告書 - オープン・イノベーションの活性化に向けて -

> 2017年7月13日 オープン API のあり方に関する検討会 (事務局:一般社団法人 全国銀行協会)

 $(source)\ \underline{https://www.zenginkyo.or.jp/fileadmin/res/news/news290713_1.pdf}$



US FS-ISAC aligning their security requirements




... and major IAM vendors are implementing it



Submit to ISO/TC 68 and is a part of the forthcoming technical specification









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- Part 1: Read Only Security Profile
- Part 2: Read and Write Security Profile

Redirect Approach


Decoupled Approach

Embedded Approach



While RFC6749 is not complete with source, destination, and message authentication,

	Sender AuthN	Receiver AuthN	Message AuthN
AuthZ Req	Indirect	None	None
AuthZ Res	None	None	None
Token Req	Weak	Good	Good
Token Res	Good	Good	Good






FAPI Part 2 is complete with source, destination, and message authentication.

■ By using OpenID Connect's Hybrid Flow and Request Object, you are pretty well covered.

	Sender AuthN	Receiver AuthN	Message AuthN
AuthZ Req	Request Object	Request Object	Request object
AuthZ Res	Hybrid Flow	Hybrid Flow	Hybrid Flow
Token Req	Good	Good	Good
Token Res	Good	Good	Good



Tokens are Sender Constrained instead of being bearer

Security Levels	Token Types	Notes
	Sender Constrained Token	Only the entity that was issued can used the token.
	Bearer Token	Stolen tokens can also be used

These are in the form of check lists.



5.2 Read and Write API Security Provisions

5.2.1 Introduction

Read and Write access carries higher financial risk; therefore the protection level required is higher than Read-Only access.

As a profile of The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework, this document mandates the following for the Read and Write API of the FAPI.

5.2.2 Authorization Server

The authorization server shall support the provisions specified in clause 5.2.2 of Financial API - Part 1: Read-Only API Security Profile.

In addition, the authorization server, for the Write operation,

- 1. shall require the request or request_uri parameter to be passed as a JWS signed JWT as in clause 6 of OIDC;
- 2. shall require the response_type values code id_token or code id_token token;
- 3. shall return ID Token as a detached signature to the authorization response;
- 4. shall include state hash, s_hash, in the ID Token to protect the state value;
- 5. shall only issue holder of key authorization code, access token, and refresh token for write operations;
- 6. shall support OAUTB or MTLS as a holder of key mechanism;
- 7. shall support user authentication at LoA 3 or greater as defined in X.1254;
- 8. shall support signed ID Tokens; and
- 9. should support signed and encrypted ID Token.

(source) https://bitbucket.org/openid/fapi/src/master/Financial_API_WD_002.md



Crypto Requirements are tightened for interoperability and security

8.5 TLS Considerations

As confidential information is being exchanged, all interactions shall be encrypted with TLS (HTTPS).

Section 7.1 of Financial API - Part 1: Read Only API Security Profile shall apply, with the following additional requirements:

- 1. Only the following 4 cipher suites shall be permitted:
 - O TLS DHE RSA WITH AES 128 GCM SHA256
 - O TLS ECDHE RSA WITH AES 128 GCM SHA256
 - o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 - o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

8.6 JWS Algorithm Considerations

JWS signatures shall use the PS256 or ES256 algorithms for signing.

(source) https://bitbucket.org/openid/fapi/src/master/Financial_API_WD_002.md





And now working on the decoupled approach ...

CIBA (client initiated backchannel authentication) profile.

https://bitbucket.org/openid/fapi/src/master/Financial_API_WD_CIBA.md

Redirect Approach Decoupled Approach

Embedded Approach





- ■Giving bearer credentials to a third party is a bad idea.
- ■GDPR explicit consent for third party data transfer?
 - What would be the liability implications?
- Perhaps per app "password"?

Redirect Approach Decoupled Approach


Embedded Approach



We have other works as well...

E.g. The OpenBanking OpenID Dynamic Client Registration Specification


OpenBanking Client Registration Overview (Options A, B)





... and perhaps

Intent registration endpoint





How can we tell that the implementation conforms to the specification?



Once it passes the test, the implementer can self-certify and publish.

- That gets the implementers under the premise of the article 5 of the FTC Act.
- The log will be openly available so others can also find out false claims.

See http://openid.net/certification/ for details enters to test their conformance.



By the way







After all, there is nothing specifically "Financial"



It is a general purpose High Security API protection protocol





- Some of the candidates ...
- Fully Assured Protection Interoperable
- Fair Assurance Protection Interface
- **Full Assurance Protection Interface**
- Full Assurance Profile Interface (FAPI) WG
- Plus ...

Introduction to OpenID Connect Self Issued Provider

2018-05-15

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- **<u>0.2.4.</u>** request_uri kationale
- **6.3.** Validating JWT-Based Requests
 - **6.3.1.** Encrypted Request Object
 - **6.3.2.** Signed Request Object
 - 6.3.3. Poquest Parameter Assembly and Validation
- 7. Self-Issued OpenID Provider
 - 7.1. Self-Issued OpenID Provider Discovery
 - 7.2. Self-Issued OpenID Provider Registration
 - 7.2.1. Providing Information with the "registration" Request Parameter
 - 7.3. Self-Issued OpenID Provider Request
 - 7.4. Self-Issued OpenID Provider Response
 - 7.5. Self-Issued ID Token Validation
- On Subject Identifier Types
 - **8.1.** Pairwise Identifier Algorithm
- 9. Client Authentication
- **10.** Signatures and Encryption
 - **10.1.** Signing




It is an IdP on your local machine

- I am the issuer of my "identity" therefor it will not be taken away
- Sounds a lot like "Self Sovereign Identity", is it not?
- It does not need Blockchain, and does not leak information like current proposals that uses Blockchain.

- Wire-protocol-wise, it is OpenID Connect with a little twist.
- ■It can obviously use the platform supported Authenticator,
 - e.g. FIDO/WebAuthen supporting TEE through biometric unlocking.


Aggregated Claims















Self Issued Provider

Tap on it.



connect.openid4.us

Hello vrv-X0e69uJD3jvFtAFKgn-tF1fmSqgJknN5v34AJkl

```
"gender": "M",
    "iat": "2018-05-15T19:49:37.000Z",
   "family_name": "Sakimura ",
   "nonce": "12p29on",
   "sub": "vrv-X0e69uJD3jvFtAFKgn-tF1fmS
qqJknN5v34AJkI",
   "sub_jwk": {
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       "n": "AN8Yh9JyU1AnHpx01TKsv6AEqlx
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   },
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